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Ethnographic Research in the U.S. Intelligence Community:
Opportunities and Challenges
Bridget Rose Nolan

Abstract
This article considers lessons learned from conducting research inside the
intelligence community. Drawing on a year of ethnographic field work and
interviews at the National Counterterrorism Center, I show that “boundary
personnel”- people who navigate between the worlds of academia and
national security - provide value added in the form of tacit knowledge that
outside researchers would not be able to deliver. At the same time, these
people face delays, challenges to freedom of information, and ethical
considerations that are unique to their positions. Despite setbacks, social
scientists must continue their engagement with national security
organizations to further our understanding of how these powerful institutions
operate.
Keywords
Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, counterterrorism, ethnography,
Intelligence Community, National Counterterrorism Center, NCTC,
organizational culture, sociology, tacit knowledge

The relationship between science and the government has historically
been fraught. Scholars have shown that the boundary between the two
domains is not static but rather dynamic and flexible, drawn and redrawn in
historically contingent and sometimes ambiguous ways (Gieryn 1983;
Dennis 1999; Berling and Bueger 2013; Wellerstein 2008). Research on
scientists in STEM fields pays particular attention to the difficulty of
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negotiating the tension between academic freedom and national security
interests. For instance, Evans and Valdivia (2012) discuss the U.S.
government’s intervention in scientists’ publication of the methods used to
replicate the H5N1 bird flu virus over bioterrorism concerns; Russell and
Webster (2005) discuss a similar controversy over the genetic sequencing of
the 1918 flu virus. Others show that the development and deployment of
powerful weapons over the last century centralized science and technology
as security concerns for the U.S. government (e.g., Vogel, Balmer, Evans,
Kroener, Matsumoto, and Rappert 2017; Bussolini 2011). Nuclear weapons
in particular have been a consistent focal point, as have the social
organization of their development at Los Alamos National Laboratory and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (e.g., Gusterson 1996; Rhodes
1986; Teller 1993; Bussolini 2011; Masco 2006).
The emphasis in this literature is understandably on natural sciences,
math, and engineering, so for the most part it overlooks how social scientists
negotiate similar tensions when working on issues related to national
security, intelligence, and the military. In addition, research exploring the
relationship between science and the government focuses almost exclusively
on scientists who do research for the U.S. government, rather than those
who do research on it. Finally, the contested material in this research is
information, not personnel: scientists and government officials, often seeing
themselves as occupying separate spheres, negotiate a blurry space in which
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both entities lay claim to some scientific finding, method, or product. The
social positions of the people themselves are not contested in the literature;
the spheres seem to blur when committees are formed to negotiate
acceptable information use (Evans and Valdivia 2012), but there is no
discussion of the ways in which individual researchers may navigate both
spaces. This article looks at the challenges and opportunities presented
when social scientists themselves blur the boundary between government
work and academia. How does their negotiation of this interstitial space
affect the research process? What kinds of insights can the security
clearance yield for an academic researcher, and - perhaps more importantly
- what are its limitations? How might these accesses shape social scientists,
and what are the longer-term implications for scholarship as a result of their
experiences inside the intelligence community? Finally, what can research
inside the U.S. intelligence community teach us about its people, analytic
practices, and organizational culture that social scientists would not be able
to learn from the outside?1
1 Methods: Ethnography is the descriptive documentation of a living culture. It usually
combines a number of approaches, such as participant-observation, interview, and
artifact analysis, to present a detailed picture of the culture of interest. It is generally
qualitative and designed to present the view of the study subjects as understood from
the researcher’s own perspective. Ethnographic methods originally emerged in
anthropology, but have since been adopted by other social sciences, including sociology.
The classical view is that ethnography requires the researcher to spend significant time
(years, ideally) living among the people they are studying, but sociologists have had
success in using ethnography to study cultures in work places, schools, or other
organizational locations without actually living with the people they are studying. My
research fits into this latter application of ethnographic methods. I worked as a
counterterrorism analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) between 2007 and
2011. During my time there, I sought and received permission to conduct an
ethnography of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which is the organization
that was created after 9/11 to address the 9/11 Commission Report’s finding that
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Tacit Knowledge
In thinking of the ways in which people may blur the space between
academia and security organizations, it is useful to deploy the concept of
boundary objects, “those objects that both inhabit several communities of
practice and satisfy the informational requirements of each” (Bowker and
Starr 1999, 297). What we might call “boundary personnel” instead of
“boundary objects” have similar features. I argue that social scientists
wishing to study how the intelligence community (IC) works cannot get a
comprehensive picture of what the organizations are like without spending

intelligence agencies were not sharing information the way they could or should. NCTC
was created to house officers from all around the IC under one roof, with the hopes that
working alongside representatives from other agencies would encourage analysts to
share information. During the course of my research, I wanted to explore whether and
how that information sharing occurs. As a sociologist, I was interested in learning about
the small, day-to-day interactions that comprise the life of the analyst, as well as the
larger organizational dynamics that accomplish intelligence work. I conducted 20 indepth interviews between August and December of 2010. I knew most of the participants
personally, but a few people I did not know got in touch with me after hearing about my
study and asked to participate. I aimed to get a relatively diverse sample with regard to
the analysts’ home agencies, to get as many perspectives as possible. Official
demographic information was not available, but my perception is that the population of
analysts in the wider IC is not particularly diverse on measures of race, gender, and age,
so there is some, but not much, variation on these measures in my interview sample.
The average age of the interview participants was 31.8 years, with a range of 24 to 47
and a median of 31.5. All but three of the participants identified as white; 13 identified as
female and 7 as male. The average amount of time served at NCTC was 2.48 years, with
a range of four months to six years, and a median of two years. The average amount of
time served in the federal government was 7.7 years, with a range of 2 to 15 years, and
a median of 7.5 years. Thirteen of the participants had at least one graduate-level
degree, usually a master’s degree. Thirteen of the participants claimed CIA as their home
organization; seven of the longer-serving participants claimed more than one home
organization over the course of their careers. Drawing from my observations and
experiences, my sample reflects the analyst population writ large, with the possible
exception of the gender breakdown. (My sense was that most analysts were male, but
again I cannot be sure, because official demographics are not available; in any case,
there is still very much an “old boys’ club” feel to both CIA and NCTC, which analysts
reported and with which my own experience was commensurate [e.g., Jones 2016].)
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time as a practitioner. The primary reason for this is that intelligence work
relies heavily on tacit knowledge - knowledge that, contrary to explicit
knowledge, cannot be and/or has not been effectively stored or transferred
by impersonal means such as verbal or written instructions (MacKenzie and
Spinardi 1995).
The prevalence of tacit knowledge in professions is not new or unique
to intelligence work - it is an important reason why many occupations have
historically relied on the apprenticeship model - but the combination of the
primacy of tacit knowledge with the secrecy that shrouds the IC means that
spending time as a practitioner is absolutely crucial for understanding this
work. Boundary personnel are especially important for this research because
tacit knowledge is embodied (MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995). Even in
security areas that may at first seem to rely more heavily on explicit
knowledge - MacKenzie and Spinari (1995), for instance, focus on the
production and reproduction of nuclear weapons - tacit knowledge proves so
important that its absence would result in the “uninvention” of the weapons
entirely, even in the presence of explicit knowledge in the form of lab
notebooks, computer programs, and general physics expertise. For
intelligence practitioners, tacit knowledge often takes the form of
“judgment”: a sense, accumulated in the body over some period of time of
having done the job, of what works and what doesn’t, of what seems right
and what feels wrong. Of course, some of what the CIA does has a hard-
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science component, but much of the subject matter policymakers want to
know about requires even more reliance on tacit knowledge because of the
challenges, gaps, and uncertainties involved in collecting and analyzing
intelligence.
The sense of judgment conferred by the accumulation of tacit
knowledge takes time to develop. As a result, practitioners speak of a “long
learning curve” (MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995, 62); with regard to nuclear
weapons development, even designers with relevant physics backgrounds
take “five years to become useful.” My own experience is commensurate; in
my dissertation, I wrote the following about my first impressions inside the
CIA:
The learning curve was unbelievably steep, not only in the methods of
doing the job but also the ways in which people exchanged mere
pleasantries. I frequently found myself understanding the words, but
not the meaning, of what people said to me, which created a profound
sense of culture shock and made the adjustment incredibly difficult.
This shock was exacerbated by the secrecy in which the job is
engulfed; there is no real way to prepare oneself for the first days and
weeks of this job. It was as though a curtain were lifted, and all of the
people, places, and things behind it came hurtling at me all at once
with the force of water from a fire hose. (Nolan 2013, 3)
I was explicitly told in my first weeks inside the IC that I should not
expect to get anything done (in the form of publishing classified papers) for
at least the first few months, maybe even a year. It can take up to six
months to be granted access to some classified systems, and accumulating
the tacit knowledge required not only to do quality intelligence analysis but
also to navigate routine daily situations simply must be acquired the hard
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/5
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way. Many of my colleagues pointed to the organization’s reliance on tacit
knowledge as one of their greatest sources of overwhelm and frustration.
They reported, and my own experience confirmed, that tacit knowledge
ranged from relatively small matters, such as figuring out the correct form to
complete, to larger matters, such as knowledge of one’s own job description
or the goals of the larger organization. Part of this confusion at the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) stems from the fact that as a fledgling
organization, NCTC’s predecessor simply adopted many of CIA’s bureaucratic
procedures. This is confusing for non-CIA personnel at NCTC, but it is also
confusing for CIA employees, because it is often unclear which organization
is supposed to take responsibility for an action. Some analysts told me that
they felt the management sometimes used this lack of clarity between
agencies as an excuse not to fund training opportunities or travel expenses.
A few excerpts illustrate this idea:
CIA analyst: If there is [frustration at work], it’s usually figuring out
how you’re supposed to do something, what the proper procedure is.
It’s hard to figure out if it’s not written down anywhere. Like travel.
The simplest thing like buying a plane ticket is so not intuitive, and
you often don’t even know to ask. (Nolan 2013, 34)
CIA analyst relatively new to the IC: This place is just so weird,
because the people here seem to assume things that are not at all
intuitive, and then they get mad when you haven’t come to those
conclusions yourself. Like, when I first started here, they were doing
some construction and there were fewer parking spaces, so they
instituted this valet parking system. But it wasn’t like a valet in the
real world where you pull up and hand the attendant the key or
whatever. You were supposed to just know that you had to leave your
car key on the left rear tire, in case the valet had to move your car.
Even on your first day without having met anyone you were somehow

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

7

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 5

supposed to know this. Well, I’d been working there for months and I
didn’t know it. Why would you assume something like that? How does
that make intuitive sense? So I took my keys with me, and it turns out
I was blocking in one of the higher-ups who needed to get out to go to
a briefing, and they sent this system-wide flash alert to everyone’s
computer screen about my car, and it was just so embarrassing, but
like, how was I supposed to know? And how was I supposed to know
that I didn’t even know how to park my car? Stuff like that makes you
start second-guessing everything you took for granted before. (Nolan
2013, 34)
Several analysts I talked to (and my own experience) corroborated
this idea of not only not knowing something, but not even knowing what to
know or what to ask, which contributed to this overall feeling of chaos. In a
larger, more general sense, many of my colleagues told me that they often
were not really sure what their jobs were, and they felt that they had very
little understanding of what other people in the organization do, even those
in the same analytic group:
CIA analyst: NCTC is really focused on getting tools and training its
people but—there’s all this talk about loose threads, like the Pursuit
cell [the group created after the 2009 failed Christmas Day bombing to
follow so-called “loose threads”], and I don’t really know what that
means. I don’t even know what I’m doing on a day to day basis. We’re
fighting the War on Terror. What does that actually mean? How do you
specifically go about that day to day? Like, when we were fighting the
Cold War, we were more sure then, I think. There was a country that
we could point to and we knew we were fighting. Now it’s like,
networks, there don’t seem to be countries anymore with this, and it’s
really hard to know what winning this war would look like. (Nolan
2013, 35)
CIA analyst: Over the time that I worked in the IC, I was always
amazed at how little people knew about other people’s jobs. … You’ve
been there three and a half years, and you’re telling me that you don’t
know anything outside of REM [analytic group]. I don’t know anything
about REM. And we’re just within one area. Within LX [the Liberty
Crossing building, where NCTC is located], there are floors dedicated
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/5
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to the FBI or the CIA. Do you know who even works there? Have you
ever been there? It’s not like HQ where there are areas you can’t get
into. But LX isn’t like that. So I mean, LX is like Spaceballs. Do you
know the scene I’m talking about? It’s like the captain of the ship, and
he’s talking to the guy on the screen, and he’s like, WTF, we can’t hear
you, and it’s like, they just come around to the other side of the
screen. It’s like a SVTC [secure video teleconference], you realize half
the people in the SVTC are actually in the building and we’re wasting
15 minutes trying to get the damn thing to work. I wouldn’t be
derogatory toward NCTC though. I would think about it as like, the
incredible challenges that NCTC has to navigate in order to integrate
the way it wants to, with something that’s fundamentally designed not
to be integrated. (Nolan 2013, 35)
This phenomenon is not uncommon in large organizations; Vaughan
(1996, 250) states that as organizations grow, the actions of the people that
comprise them become less easily observable. Vaughan also says that
secrecy is a fundamental feature of any organization, not just organizations
like the CIA that specifically require secrecy to protect sources and methods.
Increased hierarchy, bureaucratization, and specialized knowledge create
social distance among employees, making it difficult to understand fully what
another part of the organization does, and so this finding may not seem
remarkable in a government organization like NCTC. But the added
dimension of secrecy as a specific function of the organization adds
complexity to these issues, and as Vogel et al. (2017) remind us, the unique
operation of secrecy in security organizations, as opposed to private life or
the commercial sector, means these organizations are worthy of special
consideration.
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These examples barely scratch the surface of the many ways in which
intelligence work relies on tacit knowledge. Creating written products - the
primary task for intelligence analysts - is frequently described as an “art,”
which connotes the importance of subjective judgment and creativity (e.g.,
Hasler 2010; Crumpton 2013). Even more often, intelligence work is
characterized as “tradecraft,” a “catchall for the often-idiosyncratic methods
and techniques required to perform [intelligence] analysis,” defined as
“practiced skill in a trade or art” that “purposefully implies a mysterious
process learned only by the initiated and acquired only through the elaborate
rituals of professional indoctrination” (Johnston 2005, 17-18). Echoing
MacKenzie and Spinardi’s (1995) finding that judgment is a collective
phenomenon rather than an individual one, analytic papers in the IC are
considered “community” products; the paper does not bear the name of the
individual author, but rather the seal of the institution for which the author
works. The CIA at least recognizes that tacit knowledge is embodied; some
CIA-sponsored documents explicitly talk about the loss of institutional
memory due to attrition (e.g., Johnston 2005), and during my time there,
people in positions of power talked about the need to preserve this kind of
embodied information by strengthening mentoring programs and generating
“lessons learned”-type documents.
All of this speaks to the benefits - indeed, the necessity - of having an
intelligence practitioner with the proper academic training conduct research
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on the intelligence community. Depending on their research questions,
academics with no personal experience on the “inside” may find their lack of
access to be an insurmountable challenge; the practitioner’s embodied sense
of the profession is thus the greatest opportunity afforded by their access.

Socialization and the Security Clearance
“Insider” status presents challenges in addition to its opportunities.
Getting a security clearance to work at the CIA is a long, arduous,
sometimes-harrowing process that requires the applicant to open their lives
entirely to a faceless bureaucracy with no guaranteed payoff. I was required
to have a background check, during which the government talked to family
members, close friends, and neighbors about my personal character and
lifestyle. I submitted to days of physical and psychological testing, including
an eight-hour polygraph exam. I did all of this voluntarily, but with no idea
of what kinds of information was waiting for me once I had a Top Secret
clearance. There is, by definition, no way to know until you know. This
access unquestionably shaped me as a person and as a social scientist; I
distinctly recall a colleague’s comments in my first weeks at the Agency that
they could tell by the look on my face that I had been “read in”—that is, that
I had learned Top Secret information. I related to Masco’s (2010: 441)
discussion of secrecy’s “distorting effects” and Daniel Ellsberg’s (2002)
reflections on the psychological effects of access to classified information in
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his autobiography. That access has static and dynamic elements; once you
know something, you know it, but the maintenance of that information
requires obfuscation, occasional lying, and many kinds of keeping track, all
of which is invisible labor that takes a toll.
Moreover, the onboarding processes for intelligence practitioners vary
by agency. My research shows that there is a persistent status hierarchy
among the intelligence agencies and that the CIA is at the top of that
hierarchy, even after the post-9/11 restructuring of the U.S. Intelligence
Community. It is therefore impossible to present oneself as both an insider
and as a neutral researcher. As a researcher, I had the bias-mitigating
advantage of not having physically worked at CIA Headquarters for very long
before I started working at the National Counterterrorism Center, but I was
still a CIA person, and was viewed and treated as such during my time in the
IC. I therefore tried as much as possible to foreground the experiences and
stories of others, and included my own only when they were also
corroborated by my colleagues.
Still, insiders conducting any kind of fieldwork must guard against
what is sometimes called “going native” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995,
110) in social science research and “clientism” in the intelligence community
(Lowenthal 2014, 163): the tendency to become so immersed in the target
population that the researcher defends or apologizes for that population
instead of analyzing it more objectively. All ethnographers must prioritize
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the protection of their subjects’ identities, but research inside the IC ups the
ante on this. Vogel et al. (2017) highlight this challenge, suggesting that
concerns about protecting information and the identities of colleagues inside
the IC may result in the researcher’s actively and selectively deleting
important details from the story they tell. Given that writing an ethnography
is already a process that shapes rather than reflects the population of
interest (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995), the added security concerns
surrounding identity protection constitute a further challenge to the research
process. I certainly made these kinds of choices, both consciously and—I am
sure—unconsciously. There were many incredibly rich details and
interactions that I could not document because of the highly sensitive
circumstances in which they occurred, and there were times when I probably
could have written about certain situations but chose not to in order to
protect my colleagues. I felt that these choices were necessary for me to
uphold both my oath of office and the ethics of field work, but I am
cognizant that these choices also necessarily affect both the research
process and the final product.

Ethical Concerns
Among the social sciences, anthropology has the longest and most
complicated history with the U.S. military and intelligence services. The U.S.
government has employed anthropologists ostensibly in pursuit of
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“sociocultural expertise” (Kusiak 2008), but controversy over its deployment
in programs such as the Human Terrain System and abuses during the Cold
War, coupled with the discipline’s colonialist history, have led to calls within
the field to examine its relationship with the U.S. government (American
Anthropological Association 2007). These concerns over “weaponizing
anthropology” (Price 2011) have resulted in recommendations from the
American Anthropological Association to revise its Code of Ethics to achieve
more granularity on issues of secrecy as a condition for funding, informed
consent, and “politically distasteful” vs. “ethically problematic” activities
(American Anthropological Association 2007, 25). The report does make
distinctions among types of research projects, noting that policy work and
organizational studies are less ethically risky than operational roles in which
anthropologists are asked to provide front-line expertise to support military
commanders in the field (American Anthropological Association 2007, 1213). These recommendations underscore the key difference in conducting
research for the U.S. military and intelligence services rather than on them
(American Anthropological Association 2007, 16).
Rob Johnston’s (2005) work on CIA analytic culture is the best
example of anthropological research on the U.S. intelligence community.
Johnston himself may be considered “boundary personnel,” since his work is
available in open sources, and he has worked both in academia and the IC.
But because his work was sponsored by the CIA - he was hired by the CIA’s
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Center for the Study of Intelligence - this research on the CIA was also for it
at the same time, which is muddier territory for the AAA’s positions on this
work. I hasten to add that I do not think Johnston’s work is ethically
questionable in any way; I merely highlight the difficulty of navigating these
two spheres for any researcher.
Sociology does not have the same colonial history as anthropology; I
am also the only sociologist I know of who has attempted ethnographic
research on the IC, so the ethical challenges I faced are confined to my own
projects rather than rising to the level of discipline-wide ethical
contemplation, as anthropology has required. Although my work in many
ways was a straightforward workplace ethnography, secrecy and security
concerns created additional dilemmas. For instance, the American
Sociological Association’s Code of Ethics requires that informed consent be
obtained from research participants in a process that “involves oral and/or
written consent” (American Sociological Association 1999, section 12.02). I
would have preferred to have my interview participants fill out consent forms
on paper, but in order to protect their identities, I sought the blessing of my
institution’s IRB to obtain verbal consent only. Though the Code clearly
states that this is permissible, I still had to think through the ethics of less
record keeping rather than more. I also had to consider the privacy issues—
separate from security issues - that every workplace ethnographer must
face. Obtaining informed consent from interview subjects is one thing, but

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

15

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 5

what about ordinary interactions among workers in what they rightly assume
is private space? I was able to make the case to my institution’s IRB that my
research met the two criteria for the general informed consent waiver: The
research involved no more than minimal risk to the participants, and the
research could not practicably be carried out if general informed consent
were required (section 12.01). Coupled with the “top cover” of having the
Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center give me written
permission to do the project, I satisfied these ethical obligations, but not
without adding months to my timeline.
These days, the use of recording technology eases many ethnographer
concerns. The use of video/audio recording (with the subjects’ informed
consent) can allow the researcher to focus more on what is going on in the
moment without also having to worry about recording. At the CIA and at
NCTC, though, recording equipment of any kind is prohibited, which meant I
could not bring in a tape recorder, cell phone, camera, or laptop. This is
understandable for preventing the disclosure of classified information, but it
made conducting interviews quite difficult - I had to take handwritten notes,
and I was only able to get verbatim quotes if the participant was willing to
wait for me to write more than jottings or repeat what they’d said, which
often disrupted the flow of the conversation and took up valuable interview
time. Even when the interviews took place outside of the office, I still did not
want to record my colleagues in the interest of protecting their identities,
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though being able to use a laptop outside of work did allow the
conversations to flow a bit better and faster. Although I knew I had no
choice about recording, I did then have to face ethical dilemmas about how I
wanted to represent my colleagues’ experiences textually. I made careful
choices about how I was going to use quotation marks to indicate verbatim
comments when, without a recording, I could never be completely sure they
were verbatim. Even when I reviewed turns of phrase with my colleagues
and asked them to confirm that I was representing their words fairly, I
necessarily lost some of the first-take freshness and spontaneity recordings
afford.
None of these dilemmas rise to the level other social scientists have
faced in their work on and for the IC and the military, but it is important that
each ethical dilemma be taken seriously and navigated successfully in order
for the work to maintain its integrity.

Longer-Term Issues for Scholarship
There can be no doubt that the primary challenge presented to
boundary personnel stems from the non-disclosure agreement employees
with security clearances are required to sign. This contract requires the
signatory’s surrender of some First Amendment rights. From the moment of
signing, whether the employee works in national security for a day or for
thirty years, they must submit all writing related to their job to a board that
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will review it to determine whether it contains classified information. At the
CIA, that body is the Publications Review Board (PRB); if other entities, such
as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) have a stake in
the material, they also weigh in. This requirement extends beyond
traditional publication outlets such as books or articles to include blog posts,
opinion pieces, tweets, Facebook posts, resumes, speeches, and more, and
the material must be cleared before it can be shared with editors,
colleagues, advisers, friends, or anyone without a clearance for that material
(Central Intelligence Agency 2016). The need to protect against the
disclosure of classified information is of course undeniable, and signatories
enter into this contractual obligation freely.
This requirement begins to present challenges to scholarship when
classification standards become unclear. Information is classified when it is
determined that its disclosure would cause some degree of damage to
national security; the difference among Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret
information is that its disclosure would respectively cause “damage,”
“serious damage,” and “exceptionally grave damage” to national security
(The White House Executive 2009). Very little guidance is available to help
determine the differences among these phrases, which leads to
overclassification for practitioners (e.g., Ellington 2011) and uncertainty for
would-be writers and publishers. Materials available in the public domain are
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sometimes redacted anyway (Masco 2010), and approaches to releasing
classified or sensitive information seem to vary by agency (Masco 2010).
I argue that information review also varies within agencies. For
instance, when I revised a chapter of my dissertation, I included a few
sentences that the PRB had previously approved, but they were returned to
me this time redacted in the following way:
[CIA applicants] must endure days of physical and psychological
testing, including a harrowing polygraph examination, during which the
examiner may redacted redacted redacted redacted to the applicant.
My polygraph lasted redacted hours, and while spending most of that
time strapped to a tight blood pressure cuff, I redacted redacted
redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted
redacted.
I requested clarification of the new redactions, and included the original
approved manuscript from January 2015 to show where the text had
previously been cleared. I was told that the redactions were based on
“current classification guidance,” and that the Board upheld all redactions—
with the exception of the word “eight,” which I was now allowed to print:
[CIA applicants] must endure days of physical and psychological
testing, including a harrowing polygraph examination, during which the
examiner may redacted redacted redacted redacted to the applicant.
My polygraph lasted eight hours, and while spending most of that time
strapped to a tight blood pressure cuff, I redacted redacted redacted
redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted redacted.
In other words, as of January 2015, I was allowed to say that my
polygraph lasted eight hours (and that version of the manuscript remains on
the Internet for anyone to see); on November 14, 2017, I was no longer
allowed to say the word “eight”; and two days later, on November 16, it was
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allowed again. It is difficult to believe that these changes were based more
on objective “current classification guidelines” - and that those guidelines
happened to have changed in a two-day period in a way that specifically
affected my use of the word “eight” - than on the subjective individual
variation introduced by whomever answers the request for review. Does it
really matter whether people know my polygraph lasted “hours” or “eight
hours”? No, but the principle is the point: As we know from Durkheim, the
organizational approach to managing secrets is often more important than
the content of those secrets ([1912] 1995). Moreover, the workings of the
PRB itself are secretive: Despite my efforts to find out, I still do not know
how many people sit on the PRB nor whether its decisions are reached by
majority vote or some other procedure. Just as the practice of “science” is
not static, but rather a dynamic, iterative process (Gieryn 1983), so too is
the production and reproduction of “classification,” echoing Vogel et al.’s
(2017) point that knowledge more generally is socially constructed at every
step along the way.
Other scholars have grappled with similar issues. Aftergood (1999)
writes about what he calls “genuine national security secrecy”—in other
words, legitimate secrecy - as opposed to “political secrecy” (secrecy
maintained for a political advantage) and “bureaucratic secrecy” (20) (the
Weberian tendency of bureaucracies to control perception of the organization
by restricting information), both of which are illegitimate but nonetheless
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common practices dating back to World War II; Dempsey (1998) has similar
qualms. The asymmetrical power relationship between the writer and the
state further complicate freedom of speech issues, and indeed the
interactions between the PRB and the writer are sites for the performance
and reproduction of that asymmetry. Former practitioners-turnedmemoirists perhaps face less career pressure concerning the PRB but are no
less beholden to - and often no less frustrated by - its caprices (e.g., Plame
2007; Hayden 2016).
Associating with the IC or the military can also affect the scholar’s selfconcept and their relationship with their discipline. Working for the CIA in
particular is simultaneously prestigious and stigmatized; the salience of each
quality depends heavily on social context, such that the scholar may
constantly find themselves navigating which parts of their professional
experience to highlight and which to downplay. The AAA report on
anthropological engagement with the security and intelligence communities
finds that “many” of the anthropologists the committee interviewed felt
“disconnected” from the Association (American Anthropological Association
2007, 56). Some had allowed their professional memberships to lapse,
either because they no longer felt it was relevant to their work or because
“they felt uncomfortable attending conferences where they would have to
explain their involvement … to a potentially hostile audience” (American
Anthropological Association 2007, 56). An academic anthropologist who did
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contract work for the Department of Defense used the language of “staying
in the closet” about his involvement, out of fear of losing friends; another
practitioner was called a “fascist” during a session at the AAA annual
meeting because of her involvement with the military, and recalled not
getting much support from the audience in her defense (American
Anthropological Association 2007, 57). I have not encountered that kind of
hostility, but I have had people react unfavorably to my affiliation, as when a
potential editor rejected my book proposal on the grounds that “this project
takes a lot of granted: i.e. that the work of these counter-intelligence agents
should be wholly supported” (personal correspondence, 6/27/14). 2 If other
sociologists take issue with my affiliation, it is most likely to be expressed in
a way that would make it indistinguishable from the many kinds of rejection
academics already face in a hyper-competitive field (for instance, having
articles or grant proposals rejected, or not being invited to interview for a
job).
The requirement to submit all written work to the PRB also introduces
a timing issue for scholars. The longer the manuscript and the more entities
that are involved, the longer this review process can take; one must
resubmit revisions to the PRB as well, such that the researcher must draft
the work on their own, obtain PRB approval before sending the manuscript
to colleagues or editors, then go back for further review with the PRB after
revisions are complete, then go back for more review if editors or colleagues
2 I choose not to include additional citation information to protect the editor’s identity.
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suggest further revisions. The process of publishing in sociology has already
come under scrutiny for, among other things, the amount of time it can take
to get through review; the requirement to send all written work to the IC
every step of the way has the effect of significantly slowing down an
already-sluggish process. This can leave the researcher in the position of
having done interesting research, but not having much to show for the
amount of time that has to pass before it is published - an additional
pressure in a supremely difficult job market and tenure process. A
practitioner-academic may have published prolifically in classified journals or
other forums, but if that work must remain classified, their CV may appear
blank. Gusterson (1999, 58) addresses this problem - the “death of the
author” - among nuclear scientists working at Livermore Laboratory, but the
lack of ownership over their government work is an issue with which all
practitioners must contend if they intend to negotiate that transition
successfully.
Restrictions on writing for former employees means that boundary
personnel do not have the same freedoms to respond to critics of their
writing or comment on current events in a timely manner. These days, it is
not uncommon for academics to have Twitter accounts or personal websites
that they use to increase their visibility in their field, but the requirement to
send all writing to the PRB results in delays that mitigate the effectiveness of
these platforms when used for career-enhancement purposes.
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Longer-term implications for scholarship also depend upon one’s status
in the IC. If the researcher leaves the IC to pursue academia, they are still
beholden to the regulations of the review board but may be unable to gain
further access to the population. Thus, if an editor or reviewer raises an
issue that would be best addressed with further inquiry—follow-up interviews
or more observations—the researcher is likely unable to fulfill this request. If
the researcher has remained inside the IC to allow for continued access,
they are subject to additional standards of review that may make getting
manuscripts out even more difficult than it already is. Although a former
employee’s writings can only be rejected if the manuscript contains classified
information, current employees face additional standards, such as whether
the research interferes with the employee’s job duties or with U.S. national
security interests.
Staying on the inside also means the researcher must continue to deal
with the labyrinthine bureaucracy that comprises the U.S. government. On
top of the standard delays and inefficiencies, the researcher may be met
with resistance from unknown bureaucrats who are not even involved in the
research and spend much of their time seemingly spinning their wheels.
Thus, there are pros and cons to staying or leaving, but either decision will
inevitably result in delayed or stalled projects. On the plus side, having
worked in the IC can lend a degree of credibility and value added that
cannot be achieved with an outsider perspective, which may offset some of
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the costs of conducting research. There is an argument to be made that the
benefits outweigh the costs, but to the extent possible, academics should
plan and prepare for these substantial costs when developing their research
agendas.

Conclusion
I have focused primarily on the challenges and opportunities presented
to individual scholars - what I’ve termed “boundary personnel” - as they
navigate dual identities as intelligence practitioners and scholars. But it is
crucial to remember that this negotiation is taking place in the context of
macro-level approaches to notions of secrecy and openness that are
constantly shifting in response to and/or in anticipation of geopolitical
realities. In the 21st century - and especially post-9/11 - the government
has publicized efforts to declassify more material (McDermott 2011), and the
official rhetoric has shifted towards the value of increased information
sharing and collaboration among the intelligence agencies, from a “need to
know” to a “need to share” posture.3 At the same time, researchers have
seen a contradiction emerge: They argue that this same period has resulted
in more classification and restricted access to information from the outside
(Ellington 2011; Masco 2010) in what they term the “securocrats’ revenge”
(Aftergood and Blanton 1999, 457) and the “iron curtain of secrecy” (Ericson
3 This terminology is problematic as it potentially reads as a false dichotomy: Information
must always be shared with those with a genuine need to know, although the point of the
underlying sentiment is taken.
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2005). These constantly shifting dynamics mean that there can never be a
standard approach to this work; scholars must contend with the sense that
the sand is always shifting beneath their feet.
Rindzeviciute (2015) has suggested that massive government
disclosures can go too far the other way and cause unanticipated harm, such
that a “sweet spot” between full secrecy and full transparency may be
desirable, if it even makes sense to think in these terms. But it is not in the
government’s best interest to limit inquiries too much either, because
transparency and accountability are essential elements of a democracy.
Similarly, it is unwise for boundary personnel to back away entirely and
become discouraged by these many challenges. Social scientists - especially
those who study organizations and bureaucracies more generally - have an
intellectual obligation to engage with the intelligence community and other
security institutions, so that we may better understand how these complex
seats of power operate. The value added of having practitioners do this work
is that their tacit knowledge provides nuance and complexity to a body of
scholarship that would otherwise suffer from their absence.

References
Aftergood, Steven. 1999.“Governmental Secrecy and Knowledge
Production: A Survey of Some General Issues.” In Secrecy and
Knowledge Production. Occasional Paper No. 23, edited by Judith

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/5
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.020105

26

Nolan: Ethnographic Research in the U.S. Intelligence Community

Reppy, 17-29. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Peace Studies Program.
http://large.stanford.edu/publications/crime/references/dennis/occasion
al-paper23.pdf
Aftergood, Steven, and Tom Blanton. 2009 [1999]. “The Securocrats’
Revenge.” In Government Secrecy: Classical and Contemporary
Readings, edited by Susan Maret and Jan Goldman, 457-59. Westport,
CT: Libraries Unlimited.
American Anthropological Association. 2007. Commission on the
Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security and Intelligence
Communities. Final Report, November 4.
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/20640
American Sociological Association. 1999. “Code of Ethics of the ASA
Committee on Professional Ethics.” Washington: American Sociological
Association.
http://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/code_of_ethics_aug_2017__1
.pdf
Berling, Trine Villumsen, and Christian Bueger. 2013. “Practical Reflexivity
and Political Science: Strategies for Relating Scholarship and Political
Practice.” Political Science and Politics 46, no. 1: 115-19.
Bowker, Geoffrey, and Susan Leigh Starr. 1999. Sorting Things Out:
Classification and its Consequences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bussolini, Jeffrey. 2011. “Los Alamos as Laboratory for Domestic Security
Measures: Nuclear Age Battlefield Transformations and the Ongoing
Permutations of Security.” Geopolitics 16: 329-58.
Central Intelligence Agency. 2017. “Keeping Secrets Safe: The
Publications Review Board.” February 2. https://www.cia.gov/aboutcia/publications-review-board
Crumpton, Henry A. 2013. The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in
the CIA’s Clandestine Service. New York: Penguin Books.

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

27

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 5

Dempsey, James X. 1998. “The CIA and Secrecy.” In A Culture of
Secrecy: The Government Versus the People’s Right to Know, edited by
Athan G. Theoharis, 37-59. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas.
Dennis, Michael Aaron. 1999. “Secrecy and Science Revisited: From
Politics to Historical Practice and Back.” In Secrecy and Knowledge
Production. Occasional Paper No. 23, edited by Judith Reppy, 1-16.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Peace Studies Program.
http://large.stanford.edu/publications/crime/references/dennis/occasion
al-paper23.pdf
Durkheim, Emile. 1995 [1912]. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.
Trans. Karen E. Fields. New York: Free Press.
Ellington, Thomas C. 2011. “Secrecy and Disclosure: Policies and
Consequences in the American Experience.” In Research in Social
Problems and Public Policy, Volume 19: Government Secrecy, edited by
Susan Maret, 67-90. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group.
Ellsberg, Daniel. 2002. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon
Papers. New York: Penguin.
Ericson, Timothy L. 2005. "Building Our Own" Iron Curtain": The
Emergence of Secrecy in American Government." The American
Archivist 68, no. 1: 18-52.
http://americanarchivist.org/doi/pdf/10.17723/aarc.68.1.9m260j24417
7p553?code=same-site
Evans, Samuel A. W., and Walter D. Valdivia. 2012. “Export Controls and
the Tensions Between Academic Freedom and National Security.”
Minerva 50, no. 2: 169-90.
Gieryn, Thomas F. 1983. “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science
from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of
Scientists.” American Sociological Review 48, no. 6: 781-95.
Gusterson, Hugh. 1996. Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End
of the Cold War. Berkeley: University of California Press.

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/5
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.020105

28

Nolan: Ethnographic Research in the U.S. Intelligence Community

___. 1999. “Secrecy, Authorship and Nuclear Weapons Scientists.” In
Secrecy and Knowledge Production. Occasional Paper No. 23, edited by
Judith Reppy, 57-75. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Peace Studies
Program.
http://large.stanford.edu/publications/crime/references/dennis/occasion
al-paper23.pdf
Hammersley, Martyn and Paul Atkinson. 1995. Ethnography: Principles in
Practice. London: Routledge.
Hasler, Susan.2010. Intelligence: A Novel of the CIA. New York: Thomas
Dunne.
Hayden, Michael. 2016. Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the
Age of Terror. New York: Penguin.
Johnston, Rob. 2005. Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community:
An Ethnographic Study. Washington: Central Intelligence Agency Center
for the Study of Intelligence. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-forthe-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/analytic-culture-in-the-u-s-intelligencecommunity/analytic_culture_report.pdf
Jones, Abigail. 2016. “Women of the CIA: The Hidden History of American
Spycraft.” Newsweek, September 21.
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/09/30/cia-women-national-security500312.html
Kusiak, Pauline. 2008. “Sociocultural Expertise and the Military: Beyond
the Controversy.” Military Review November-December: 65-76.
Lowenthal, Mark M. 2015. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Thousand
Oaks, CA: CQ Press.
MacKenzie, Donald and Graham Spinardi. 1995. “Tacit Knowledge,
Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons.” American
Journal of Sociology 101, no. 1: 44-99.

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

29

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 [2018], Art. 5

Masco, Joseph. 2006. The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in
Post-Cold War New Mexico. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Masco, Joseph. 2010. “’Sensitive but Unclassified’: Secrecy and the
Counterterrorist State.” Public Culture 22, no. 3: 433-63.
McDermott, Patrice. 2011. “Secrecy Reform or Secrecy Redux?: Access to
Information in the Obama Administration.” In Research in Social
Problems and Public Policy, Volume 19: Government Secrecy, edited by
Susan Maret, 189-218. Bingley, UK: Emerald.
Nolan, Bridget. 2013. “Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United
States Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study of the National
Counterterrorism Center.” Unpublished Dissertation.
Plame, Valerie. 2007. Fair Game. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Price, David. 2011. Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in the
Service of the Militarized State. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
Rhodes, Richard. 1986. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon
& Schuster.
Rindzeviciute, Egle. 2015. “The Overflow of Secrets: The Disclosure of
Soviet Repression in Museums as an Excess.” Current Anthropology 56,
supplement 12: S276-S285.
Russell, Charles J., and Robert G. Webster. 2005. “The Genesis of a
Pandemic Influenza Virus.” Cell 123, no. 3: 368-71.
Teller, Edward. 1993. “The Laboratory of the Atomic Age.” Los Alamos
Science, 21: 32-37.

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/5
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.020105

30

Nolan: Ethnographic Research in the U.S. Intelligence Community

Vaughan, Diane. 1996. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky
Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
Vogel, Kathleen M., Brian Balmer, Sam Weiss Evans, Inga Kroener, Miwao
Matsumoto, and Brian Rappert. 2017. “Knowledge and Security.” In The
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, edited by Ulrike Felt,
Rayvon Fouche, Clark A. Miller, and Laurel Smith-Doerr, 973-1001.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wellerstein, Alex. 2008. “From Classified to Commonplace: The Trajectory
of the Hydrogen Bomb Secret.” Endeavour 32, no. 2: 47–52.
The White House. 2009. Executive Order 13526: Classified National
Security Information. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-0105/html/E9-31418.htm

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

31

